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INTRODUCTION
Questions about property rights, their origin, and their measure
have been at the forefront of serious political discourse since ancient
times. Classical writers usually approached the topic from an immu-
table and enduring state of nature theory.' This theory asks: should
all people en masse be just placed down on earth, what principles
should decide the proper configuration of property rights? This ini-
tial inquiry addresses the distribution between those rights which
are held in common and those which, although unowned in the
state of nature, are subject to individual ownership.2 This question
always poses challenges because either extreme solution-all one,
none of the other-is likely to lead to serious allocative errors. A
mixed system is likely to produce the optimal results, but only if the
lines are drawn in the correct position. 3 It is first necessary to ex-
plain, for example, why rivers should be governed by regimes of
common rights while land should be privatized. With respect to
common property, there are no rules of priority, for all individuals
have equal access to the common resource no matter when they
arrive to the commons. 4 With respect to private property, however,
the rules on acquisition - "prior in time is higher in right" - adopt a
strict temporal priority that explains which individuals are entitled
'See J. INST. 1.2.11 (.B. Moyle trans., 5th ed., Clarendon Press 1913):
But the laws of nature, which are observed by all nations alike, are estab-
lished, as it were, by divine providence, and remain ever fixed and immu-
table: but the municipal laws of each individual state are subject to fre-
quent change, either by the tacit consent of the people, or by the subse-
quent enactment of another statute.
The obvious difficulty in this passage is that it gives no hint as to which matters are
governed by natural law, and which by positive law. The best answer, I think, is that
the natural law sets out the basic framework of obligations -respect for autonomy,
property, and contract. The positive law changes the formalities needed to imple-
ment agreements and property transfers, and refines the basic framework for par-
ticular situations.
2 See id. at 2.1.1.
3 See Richard A. Epstein, On the Optimal Mix of Private and Common Property, in
PROPERTY RIGHTS 17 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1994).
4 See State ex rel. Wood v. Consumers' Gas Trust Co., 61 N.E. 674 (Ind. 1901) (holding
that a corporation on public grant to supply natural gas is required to serve all in-
habitants of the community, irrespective of whether an individual is an existing cus-
tomer or a new arrival).
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to what property. This maxim assumes that exclusion is the applica-
ble legal norm and joint-ownership is created solely by agreement,
and not by government fiat.
In modem times, however, state of nature theory takes on a dif-
ferent coloration. It starts from the assumption that the traditional
rules of allocation set out above give an initial definition of property
rights, which, while better than the unregulated state of nature, is
capable of further improvement.5 As is common in all societies, an
increase in overall wealth tends to lead to a greater concern for en-
vironmental values, as a preoccupation with short-term survival
gives way to a public commitment to long-term resource manage-
ment. Given our collective concern with nature, it is now fair to ask
three questions. First, do the older views of property rights advance
these environmental concerns? Second, if they do not, what system
of property rights and/or regulation best preserves our environ-
ment for the present inhabitants of the world, and for posterity?
And, third, what social arrangements should secure the sensible
transition, if needed, from the present to a preferred system of
property rights?
It is often assumed that there is little overlap between the one
inquiry, which asks about the historical origins of property, and a
second that seeks to improve the system in light of today's new-
found objectives. I think that this separationist impulse is mis-
guided. The historical evolution of property rights sheds more light
on the modern inquiry than is commonly supposed. One central
function of property rights is to economize on scarce resources.
Early societies often had to combat conditions of radical scarcity
that were far more stringent than those which we face today. As a
result, any accurate account of how property rights emerge from a
state of nature tells us much about what "use rights" any property
owner should have vis-A-vis his neighbors and the public at large,
with their obvious environmental implications. Defining these use
rights clarifies the role of state enforcement and helps answer one
key question of institutional design: which restrictions may the state
impose on an owner's use of property without cost, and which re-
strictions require the payment of compensation? These issues are
51 develop this theme in Richard A. Epstein, One Step Beyond Nozick's Minimal State:
The Role of Forced Exchanges in Political Theory, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, Jan. 2005, at 286.
2009]
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broadly theoretical and their proper analysis does not depend on
the constitutions or laws of any nation, including the United States.6
The central thesis is simple enough to state. All private law devia-
tions from the state of nature work an improvement both in global
efficiency and in the standard forms of environmental protection.
Yet, at the same time, cautious legislative intervention can, in some
cases, make further substantial improvements, so long as it is con-
strained by a constitutional order that takes seriously the risk of
uncompensated takings.
In order to execute this program, this paper is divided into four
parts. The first deals with an overview of the state of nature theory.
The second part examines how the theory of property rights that
emerges deals with the temporal externalities that are so important
for understanding environmental concerns. The third part deals
with matters of spatial externalities toward the same end. In both
cases the progression runs as follows. I first address situations
where the parties are in symmetrical positions with each other. I
then address the additional complications that arise when they
stand in asymmetrical positions, both in time and in space, toward
each other. Thereafter, I explore the permutations of the common
pool problem as it arises in both the spatial and temporal dimen-
sions and the two together. The fourth part then speaks about the
role of government regulation to advance environmental objectives,
subject to the prohibitions against taking, or regulating, private
property without just compensation. A short conclusion follows.
I. STATE OF NATURE THEORY
Let us start with state of nature theory. That theory first asks
how any person gains any rights in land against the rest of the
world, without the consent of anyone else. There are really only
two basic approaches to this problem. The first, which dates back
to Roman times, holds that-excluding common property like air
and water-all land, chattels, and animals are unowned in a state
6 For a fuller exposition from a theoretical and American perspective, see generally,
Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J.
LEGAL STuD. 49 (1979) [hereinafter Epstein, Nuisance Law]; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) [hereinafter
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS].
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of nature, and that any individual keeps what he can take.7 In con-
trast, the second approach assumes that all property in the state of
nature is held in common, so that individual capture to some extent
necessarily trenches on the property rights of others. There are clear
signs of this way of thinking in the Lockean theological pro-
nouncement that God gave earth (and the animals that live on it) to
mankind in common, so that it now becomes necessary to devise
some rule - adding labor to things - that separates private property
from the commons. 8 Note that, notwithstanding the differences be-
tween these two approaches, they stand in opposition to any top-
down account of rights creation which, as with feudal systems,
starts from some recognized legal authority (whose own sovereign
position rested usually on conquest).
This bottom-up approach was by necessity and not by choice,
and the differences in the two variations count for less than their
similarities. The creation of rights by central legal command was
not feasible in the chaotic circumstances of primitive times, in
which no single person or group exerted effective and permanent
control over any territory. Nor was it possible in these settings to
adopt any requirement of universal consent before one person
could take something from the commons for his private use. Bot-
tom-up theories thus won without a contest. Locke, who prized the
consent of the governed over any assertion of royal power,9 makes
that point most vividly when he observes that the acorn belongs to
the person who takes it from the tree. Note his reasons: "Was it a
robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common?
If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwith-
standing the plenty God had given him."10 Forget about all the
problems of strategic bargaining. Practically no one could line up all
the part-owners of the common even for the most harmonious of
deliberations. Locke well understood that any system that required
universal consent for the privatization of resources would be so
clumsy that people would just take first and ask questions later,
7 See G. INST. 2.66 (W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson trans., Gerald Duckworth & Co.
1988).
8 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 25, at 18-19 (C.B. MacPherson
ed., Hackett Publ'g 1980) (1690).
9 See id. § 28, at 19-20.
10 Id. at 19.
2009]
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which is a point in favor of the less theological Roman view that
land, things, and animals were not owned by anyone in the initial
position. Historically, there was no alternative to acquisition by uni-
lateral action, whatever its theoretical imperfections.
The major problem in this system was the difficulty in justifying
how unilateral actions could legitimize the creation of property
rights against the entire world. Blackstone speaks about "a tacit and
implied assent of all mankind" in these cases,11 but with a gnawing
awareness that this argument finds no support in historical prac-
tices. He therefore declines to choose between it and the Lockean
theory of taking by occupation alone, without exploring any of the
subtleties of the Lockean proviso that one must leave behind as
much and as good for others.12
Blackstone's other answer is both blunter and more persuasive,
and it hearkens back to the quote from Locke above: "[niecessity be-
gat property."1 3 In more modem terms, the basic argument is that in
an environment with high transaction costs, a focal point equilibrium
is reached if it is widely understood that the party in possession is
entitled to ward off all others. There is no other rule that has the clar-
ity to organize connections between unrelated persons. The limita-
tions on human power necessarily imply that no one person, or even
small group of persons, can take all the needed resources. No one has
a first mover advantage that allows him to stake a claim (which re-
quires more than words) to all the land. Nor is anyone strong enough
to defend such extended territories. Nor does anyone try. The rule of
acquisition looks highly individualistic, but the property acquired by
occupation or capture does not have to remain in that simplistic state,
and usually does not. Once people take possession of particular re-
sources, they introduce voluntary sharing arrangements within fami-
lies and clans, which commonly gives them enough of an advantage
to defend themselves against external attack. The produce of that
property can in turn be sold in voluntary exchanges so that the others
can share by contract in the gains that are obtained through initial
possession. It is the prospect of that long-term diffusion of benefits
that lends modest analytical credibility to the claim that outsiders
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *9.
12 See id. at *8-9.
13 Id, at *8.
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give their "implied" consent to an occupation, given that the conse-
quences systematically redound to the benefit of all, outsiders and
insiders alike.
Once the system is created, however, its key characteristics have
to be understood. On this point it is again useful to revert to Dem-
setz's point "[a] primary function of property rights is that of guiding
incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities." 14 It is
instructive to see how this is done by looking at those negative exter-
nalities that lead to environmental issues. The next section deals with
temporal externalities, which can compromise sustainable yields. The
third section deals with spatial externalities, which likewise can lead
to excessive consumption of resources.
A. TEMPORAL EXTERNALITIES
The first simple question asks: when a person takes possession
of an acorn or an acre of land, what interest does that possession
give? The short answer was, and is, that possession gave (and gives)
ownership of an indefinite duration, for both chattels and land. This
assignment of rights meant that people did not have to, in order to
preserve their rights as a matter of law, keep their acorns in hand or
prowl the boundaries of their land. They retained ownership of
land and chattels until they consumed it, sold it, or evinced some
clear and unambiguous sign of abandonment. This theme was evi-
dent historically to both Blackstone and Bentham. Thus Blackstone
wrote:
As human life also grew more and more refined, abundance
of conveniences were devised to render it more easy, com-
modious, and agreeable; as, habitations for shelter and
safety, and raiment for warmth and decency. But no man
would be at the trouble to provide either so long as he had
only a usufructuary property in them which was to cease the
instant that he quitted possession; - if, as soon as he walked
out of his tent, or pulled off his garment, the next stranger
14 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347, 348
(1967).
20091
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who came by would have a right to inhabit the one, and to
wear the other.15
The same theme is found in Bentham:
There have been from the beginning, and there always will
be, circumstances in which a man may secure himself, by
his own means, in the enjoyment of certain things. But the
catalogue of these cases is very limited. The savage who has
killed a deer may hope to keep it for himself, so long as his
cave is undiscovered; so long as he watches to defend it,
and is stronger than his rivals; but that is all. How miser-
able and precarious is such a possession! If we suppose the
least agreement among savages to respect the acquisitions
of each other, we see the introduction of a principle to
which no name can be given but that of law. A feeble and
momentary expectation may result from time to time from
circumstances purely physical; but a strong and permanent
expectation can result only from law. That which, in the
natural state, was an almost invisible thread, in the social
state becomes a cable.16
The obvious import of both passages is the fatal institutional
weakness that comes from defining possession to cover only cases
in which a party exerts immediate physical control over property.
That definition, even if an accurate account of the meaning of the
term, carries massive inefficiencies that no legal system could long
endure. From the earliest times, the law was concerned with the
security of possession. Possession could be governed by a variety of
different legal arrangements, including the "seisin" of land, as pro-
tected by the writ of novel disseisin, or the possession of chattels, as
protected by trespass de bonis asportatis.1 7 Should the definition of
possession be confined to its narrow literal sense of "in the grasp,"
15 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *4.
16 JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112-13 (R. Hildreth trans., 4th ed.,
Trtibner & Co., Ludgate Hill 1882) (1789).
17 For discussion, see F.W. MAITLAND, Lecture III, in THE FORMS OF ACTION AT
COMMON LAW 23-26 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1916).
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these remedies would correspondingly shrink with its evanescent
scope. The person who covets the land or chattels need only lie in
wait until the owner lets some of his possessions out of his reach or
sight, and the coveter could, as of right, take it. But why bother to
pounce if the possession that you acquire is equally unstable? The
response to this problem was to alter the definition of possession,
which-under Roman law and probably before-covered cases
where the proud possessor did not keep his object within his grasp.
Thus the owner who left his house filled with his possessions (note
the choice of noun) retained possession "for it is settled that we re-
main in possession until either we voluntarily abandon it or we are
ejected by force." 18 This point has a nice economic ring; this revised
definition of possession (whereby it is kept until abandoned) con-
stitutes a strict Pareto improvement (whereby someone is better
off and no one is worse off) over the more literal definition. Eve-
ryone is better off with this system-wide security that is only pos-
sible when this expanded definition of possession sets the new
baseline against which all further alterations in the law of prop-
erty should be measured.
The obvious response is that even this expanded definition does
not address all the risks relating to the security of possession. Ma-
rauders could still come. But the best should never be the enemy of
the good. A move is always judged by whether it makes the overall
social situation better, not whether it solves all problems with a sin-
gle act. The broader definition of possession has the salutary conse-
quence of expanding the situations where the state could be called
on for assistance, which could not happen if physical separation
was tantamount to abandonment. And the revised formulations-
which track much of ordinary language, English and Latin-are
deeply embedded in the ordinary sentiments of mankind; they
shape social expectations of right or wrong conduct. This sense of
18 See DIG. 41.2.3.9 (Paul, Edict 54) (Charles Henry Monro trans.); see also BARRY
NICHOLAS, AN INTRODuCION TO ROMAN LAW 114 (1962) (The author grasps but
does not explicate the efficiency advantages: "For obvious reasons of convenience
the requirements of the law are not so strict for the retention of possession as they are
for its acquisition. I do not lose possession of my house and its contents merely by
going away for a short time, nor do I lose possession of a book which I have put in a
cupboard and forgotten.").
2009]
HeinOnline  -- 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 9 2009
New York University Journal of Law & Liberty
unquestioned legitimacy reduces the pressure on legal remedies to
keep property safe from others.
The expanded definition of possession, which makes perma-
nent ownership possible, also has powerful positive implications
for environmental protection.19 Its long time horizons allow own-
ers to make intelligent choices between investment, consumption,
and saving, just as Blackstone predicted. 2° A farmer who would
sow seed could now harvest the crops. As owner of both crops
and the land, he fully internalized any decision to compromise the
value of the land to increase crop yield. No one has an incentive to
trash the land because he cannot assure his use of it tomorrow.
The environmental soundness of the temporal decisions of private
owners is evident when one looks at the harvesting programs al-
lowed today on government-owned land. 21 Commercial firms
have a built-in incentive to clear-cut on public lands because they
do not own the long-term interest and any reduction in land value
falls on the public at large. The same timber companies operate
more prudently on their own private lands where the needed in-
ternalization takes place as a result of longer-time horizons.22 If
these companies cut down timber prematurely, they will pay the
price on their own private lands. Should timber companies invest
the net cash received from premature timber in risk-free securities,
this return would always be less than the anticipated increase in
value from allowing the timber to mature. The point here is simple
but critical. Securing environmental protection by having envi-
ronmental laws that are specifically addressed to that end is not
the only way to respond to temporal challenges. In some contexts,
the correct definition of property rights can also create a general
improvement.
19 See, e.g., Elizabeth Brubaker, The Common Law and the Environment: The Canadian
Experience, in WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 87 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners
eds., 1998).
20 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *4.
21 See John A. Baden, The True-Mann's West: Endangered and Forsaken?, in THE NEXT
WEST: PUBLIC LANDS, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMY IN THE AMERICAN WEST 107, 120-
25 (John A. Baden & Donald Snow eds., 1997).
22 The point is an old one. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *4.
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B. COMMONS PROBLEMS
The solution that works well for land, however, may not perform
as well for other resources. It is clear that the capture of animals is
necessary for food and clothing, but a rule of capture for such re-
sources ignores interdependencies of great long-term importance.
The capture rule for wild animals also creates, under both the Roman
and Lockean views, an absolute interest in animals. But it leads to a
serious disability that does not arise with land: it fails to cope with
the commons problem. Since capture of individual elements does not
allow for the preservation of the common pool, some form of privati-
zation or regulation is needed. If territories are established for non-
migratory animals, their use could obviate the problem. But, for fish
that inhabit unowned waters, detailed systems of direct regulation
are needed to ensure sustainable yields, and for these, the choice of
institutional design matters greatly. 23
It is sometimes said that the commons problem can also arise on
land, when the optimal scale changes as land is used for different
purposes.24 But in these instances, the problem does not call for ad-
ditional regulation. As long as individuals can keep outsiders from
entering, they should be capable of reorganizing their affairs to
adapt to the exigencies of particular situations. One illustration of
this situation is what Henry Smith has termed the "semicom-
mons." 25 In this context, different land uses take place at different
seasons, on a predictable and recurrent basis. Land needed for
crops during the growing season is subject to private ownership
during that period. Collective management does not produce any
efficiency in production, but rather complicates key investment de-
cisions. Yet, for the grazing of cattle outside the growing season,
these same small plots of land become nonproductive. It is better
for two hundred head of cattle to roam on one thousand acres than
for twenty cattle to be confined to each of ten one-hundred acre
23 See R. Quentin Grafton et al., Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a
Common-Pool Resource, 43 J.L. & ECON. 679 (2000).
24 Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131, 131-32 (2000); see also Martin J. Bailey, Approximate Optimality of
Aboriginal Property Rights, 35 J.L. & ECON. 183, 186 (1992).
25 Smith, supra note 24, at 131; see also Bailey, supra note 24, at 183 (making the same
point about aboriginal societies).
2009]
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farms. Here is a case where it is possible to reap and to sow in short
compass, so that the creation of a voluntary commons increases the
value of lands. But this arrangement creates additional problems of
strategic behavior. Various owners might seek to concentrate the
wear and tear on sections that they do not own, which was histori-
cally avoided by scattering the tracts of land on which each person
could grow and harvest crops. 26 Wholly without regulation, the
permanent possession of land facilitated a system of mixed uses to
respond to the temporal challenges. But if these commons were
open to others at any point in the cycle, the entire system would no
longer be sustainable.
C. SPATIAL EXTERNALITIES
The mismatches over resources do not occur only in time. They
also occur in space, where they again place additional challenges on
the system of private ownership. Traditional legal systems used
three bodies of law to deal with these problems: trespass (i.e. un-
lawful entrance) into the land of another; cattle trespass (unlawful
entrance by one's animals); and nuisance (creation of noxious con-
ditions -discharges, odors, noise and the like).27 These bodies of
law set the stage for determining the appropriate scope of govern-
ment regulation. To see how they function, it is useful to examine
two separate states of the world. The first involves perfect symmetry
in the positions of two or more landowners. In its most exacting
conditions, landowners take possession of their neighboring prop-
erties at the same time and adopt identical land use patterns. Nei-
ther party is higher or lower, or upstream or downstream, from the
other. The more difficult cases introduce some asymmetry between
the two parties on use, timing, or physical descriptions of the prop-
erty. Solving these problems paves the way for dealing with the
more complex issues involving multiple parties (as in pollution
cases) where private litigation is less effective in curbing potential
problems.
26 Smith, supra note 24, at 131-33.
27 For the laws on trespass, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 157-64 (1965); for
the rules on animals, see id. § 504 (1977); and for the laws of nuisance, see id. §§ 822-
40. The parallel provision for animals in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) is §21.
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1. Symmetrical Cases
The first task of land law is to settle the boundary conditions
between two individuals who take possession of neighboring lands
for the same use at the same time. A brute fact of nature makes it
impossible for either landowner to move away to avoid potential
land-use conflicts. Abandoning property or restricting its use each
carries real costs. The laws of trespass and nuisance control these
conflicts between users of resources fixed in space. Both bodies of
law are generalizable. No one, consistent with the rule of law, can
harm a neighbor in ways that the neighbor cannot harm him. So the
first inquiry is: how would two people who own identical plots of
land choose by agreement the rules that would allow them to
maximize the joint value of their holdings subject to this basic
equality constraint? In each case, the assumptions of this model put
them behind a perfect Rawlsian veil of ignorance. 28 Any effort to
expand their rights as land users hurts them when others make par-
allel uses of their own lands. Thus, all persons have the proper in-
centive to make honest revelations of preference in the choice of
rule, since they all are in identical position with respect to future
benefits and burdens. All choices under this constraint that yield
positive private results will also yield positive social results, given
the precise linkage between them.
This simple model explains why the rules against trespass to
land enjoy such widespread support. Free entry to the land of oth-
ers makes it unlikely that anyone will invest in clearing land, plant-
ing crops, or building structures. Good fences turn out to make
good neighbors. Even factoring in the (relatively low) costs of en-
forcement, each neighbor will be better off with an injunction
against trespass except in rare cases. Thus, in general, a person may
enter the land of another only if doing so allows him to escape some
imminent peril to life or limb.29 Likewise, it has long been held that
a party who enters the land of another to save goods that are at risk
of destruction by water or fire does not commit a trespass. 30 These
- See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
29 See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908).
30 See, e.g., Proctor v. Adams, 113 Mass. 376 (1873). There the defendant entered the
plaintiff's land to save a boat that might have otherwise been washed out to sea. He
then returned the boat to its owner, for which he received a salvage fee. The plain-
2009]
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exceptions-from the ex ante perspective -increase the value of
entitlements for all persons.
The destruction of another's property, as opposed to a minor
trespass, raises somewhat different issues. The entrant is generally
allowed to destroy another's property in order to save himself, but
that right is typically subject to a duty to compensate for inflicted
losses.31 These cases present the risk that the entrant will not take
sufficient care to minimize the loss to the owner's interest unless
that duty is imposed. Although the rule is generally wise, it is
hardly inevitable. An alternative rule could hold the entrant re-
sponsible for only those damages which exceed those which a care-
ful owner would inflict on his own land to save his own life.
32
Cattle trespass, both to and by animals, was also critical in early
agrarian societies. Hence the law quickly evolved to hold owners
strictly liable for cattle that entered other people's property. 33 In
addition, landowners could hold cattle as security for payment of
the damages so caused, thereby lowering the costs of enforcement.34
Netting out gains and losses, the prohibition against cattle trespass
provides an overall benefit to society under a regime that tolerates
forced exchanges from the strong boundary conditions. The control
of animals has obvious environmental benefits.
tiff's entry was held justified under an "implied license," which was clearly created
not by course of dealing but by the necessity of the situation. Note that there was no
reason for the landowner to receive any portion of the salvage since he contributed
nothing to the rescue and did not suffer any harm. In addition, no necessity should
be found if the owner was ready and able to effectuate the rescue as well.
31 See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
32 See, e.g., id. For a defense of the negligence position, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation
and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 425-29 (1987).
33 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 21 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
34 See GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS 106-19 (1939). The ability to
hold animals for the payment of amends has been long established. See, e.g., The
Tithe Case, Y.B. Trin. 21, Hen. 7, fol. 27, pl. 5 (1506), reprinted in C.H.S. FIFOOT,
HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 197-98 (Greenwood Press 1970) (1949)
("[lf I have beasts damage feasant [causing damage], I shall not justify my entry to
chase them out unless I first tender all amends."). The landowner could also hold the
animals for payments of amends but was under a duty to release them once the
amends were paid. Note that there could be disputes over the extent of damages, but
this version of the necessity rule is also intended to eliminate the holdout value when
the value of cattle as security exceeds the amount of the harm caused, which is the
usual case.
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Nuisance cases are the most difficult because no single approach
covers all cases. Actual nuisances come in all sizes and shapes, in-
cluding odors, discharges, and noises, which can be large or small. As
a matter of pure theory, these differences should not matter, at least
for the imposition of damages. Punish each nuisance for the harm
that it caused, no more, no less. But the transaction costs of this ap-
proach would exceed any gains that it could possibly generate, and in
practice it becomes imperative to differentiate among nuisances
based on their incidence and severity. Where runoff fouls soil and
blocks agriculture, prompt action is needed (and is typically pro-
vided). In such cases, damages are not enough, and injunctive relief
that obviates the need for the calculation and collection is preferable.
The same can be true of foul stenches and noise from sledgeham-
mers. The basic legal rule treats these high-level nuisances just like
trespasses and subjects them to a per se prohibition. This allows the
owner to collect damages for past harms and to obtain an injunction
against future ones.35
Nonetheless, injunctions for nuisance are more complex than
those against trespasses for reasons that cut across time and loca-
tion, in line with the general natural law theory. Demanding a com-
plete cessation of harm places a huge crimp on productive activity.
Across the board, the extreme precautions needed to stop the last
tiny bit of pollution dwarf the gains obtained by the innocent party.
The strong on/off switch that works for actual entry fails in nui-
sance cases. Hence, at some point, most legal systems recalibrate
their baselines and require an injured party to tolerate at least small
levels of harm.36 From behind the veil of ignorance this rule works
because, given the symmetrical position of the parties, no one
knows which side of any interaction he or she will be on. Denying
complete injunctions thus increases the value of all land from the ex
ante perspective, which obviates any distributional worries.37
This treatment of small residual harms in major nuisance cases
helps explain the proper treatment for minor nuisances. If any
35 See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining
Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985).
36 See, e.g., Bamford v. Turnley, [1862] 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-33 (Ex.) (Bramwell, B.,
concurring).
37 Epstein, Nuisance Law, supra note 6, at 76.
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smell, noise, or discharge counted as a nuisance, no one could bar-
becue in the backyard, talk on his front patio, or farm. To head off
those results, a strong live-and-let-live principle allows all low-level
nuisances to continue without compensation, and this creates uni-
form Pareto improvements that should be welcomed on all sides.
As Baron Bramwell wrote in 1862:
It is as much for the advantage of one owner as of another;
for the very nuisance the one complains of, as the result of
the ordinary use of his neighbour's land, he himself will
create in the ordinary use of his own, and the reciprocal
nuisances are of a comparatively trifling character. The
convenience of such a rule may be indicated by calling it a
rule of give and take, live and let live.38
Thus far the analysis has covered only cases of physical inva-
sions of another's property. Noninvasive conduct often causes seri-
ous dislocations. Here are two examples that call for different solu-
tions. The first situation involves lateral support. 39 Dig out your
land and the nearby land will fall over. The same logic that governs
the live-and-let-live cases takes over, so that both landowners on
level land cannot dig out to the boundary line if nearby land will
fall. That obligation, however, does not extend to cases where the
support is required for structures built close to the boundary. Here
the fear is that the unilateral action will give the first builder rights
over a neighbor who - for all practical purposes - is powerless to
stop their creation. Hence the law only requires an excavator to give
notice before his work begins so that his neighbor can shore up his
own foundations. Once the rule is in place, the first builder can ne-
gotiate for a covenant of support or build back from the property
line to minimize the risk. This treatment of noninvasive nuisances
improves overall social welfare.
The second instance deals with claims for an easement of light
or view. When one person builds so as to block the light and view
3 Bamford, 122 Eng. Rep. at 33.
39 See Corp. of Birmingham v. Allen, [1877] 6 Ch.D. 284, 288-89 (discussing the rights
of owners of mines to extract coal, preventing the extraction of coal from neighboring
mines).
HeinOnline  -- 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 16 2009
Property Rights
of another, should that be treated as a nuisance to neighbors whose
land value declines? That contention has been widely rejected in the
judge-made law tradition of most countries, and for good reason-
this rule encourages premature development. 40 That rule allows the
first to build to stop the second from building. If that situation is
acceptable, then why couldn't the neighbor stop the original build-
ing? The explanation lies in the parity in position, which can only
be preserved if either both or neither have the right to build. In gen-
eral, both plots of land are worth more with development rights.
What is true for two neighbors also applies to many. Could the first
to build stop twenty nearby owners from exercising the same privi-
lege? Clearly the answer is no.
The overall analysis, however, is not complete. Even if parties
are in identical positions at the outset, their differential investment
strategies could easily alter that balance. Clear rules governing
boundary disputes usefully set a baseline for further negotiations
that allow one landowner to buy out rights from another. The sim-
plest way to avoid conflict is an outright purchase of land. In this
case the sole owner would suffer the harm when runoff or pollution
from one portion of the land harms another part of his land. The
purchase internalizes the externality.
Sometimes an outright purchase is not feasible, however, be-
cause the neighbor has made distinctive investments in his land
that are of little value to a potential purchaser. To deal with that
problem, most legal systems allow owners to partition their assets
by selling off only part of the land rights and retaining the remain-
der. Thus the law of easements allows one person the right to walk
or ride over the land, to pollute, or to impose height or setback con-
ditions to preserve light and view.41 These transactions do not allow
either party to increase burdens on third persons, so that any mu-
tual gain between the parties creates a social benefit. Since land use
arrangements are of long duration, virtually all legal systems allow
any easements or covenants so created to bind subsequent buyers
40 See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
41 For a discussion of the permutations, see Susan F. French, Tradition and Innovation
in the New Restatement of Servitudes: A Report from Midpoint, 27 CONN. L. REV. 119
(1994).
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who have notice of the restrictions. These voluntary contracts help
correct any misallocations of resources created by the basic system
of land law.
Frequently, neighboring landowners find it difficult to negoti-
ate these deals, especially if the cooperation of many parties is
needed, for example, to preserve views. Nonetheless, in planned
unit developments, a single initial owner can, at low cost, divide
property among many private owners and reserve areas for com-
mon use. These projects reflect the income preferences of the pro-
spective buyers. Thus, in modern times, gated communities and
condominium associations use elaborate governance mechanisms
that stem from a common landlord whose function is, to paraphrase
Harold Demsetz, to "internalize the externalities" from inconsistent
land uses.42 The practice is especially instructive because it adopts a
mixed solution on the nature of property rights. These planned unit
developments give individuals fee title to their homes and sur-
rounding lands, but institute a system of roads that is closed to out-
siders but open to all members within the gated community. And
they often set aside certain areas to be held in common for recrea-
tion or park uses. Once again, a system that starts out as exclusively
private under a single owner transforms itself -through contract -
into one that consciously introduces collective elements, and the
value of these elements are preserved by restricting entry, as with
the medieval semicommons.43
Understanding the interplay between these separate and com-
mon elements gives us a window into organizing modem environ-
mental laws, which typically offer more environmental amenities to
purchasers with high income levels. Generally speaking, these agree-
ments rarely, if ever, cut down the level of protection between
neighbors from the background nuisance. Rather, they typically add
many restrictions on land use in order to maximize owner satisfac-
tion at low cost. Since these deals all involve contracting parties, all
externalities are internalized. The single initial owner adopts a devel-
opment strategy that maximizes sale value to all potential buyers so
that private incentives are aligned with social ones. In addition, any
external effects on third persons are likely to be positive, as the public
42 See Demsetz, supra note 14, at 357.
13 See Smith, supra note 24.
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can free ride on the stricter land use practices while retaining all of
their previous protections against what few nuisances remain.
2. Asymmetrical Initial Position
Let us now turn to cases of asymmetrical land use. These
harder cases make it more difficult to apply the basic rules of
nuisance and trespass outlined above because they require an
examination of these interactions in both the temporal and spa-
tial dimensions. When all parties engage in the same activities -
say, industrial - a greater tolerance of neighboring nuisances
generally works to the advantage of all parties.44 Yet once the
different parcels of land are amenable to different use patterns,
should the level of reciprocal harm be calibrated to the high-
intensity or the low-intensity nuisance-type use? Usually, the
low-level user wins, but a single low-intensity user in a district
with many high-intensity users may not prevail.45 Rather than
shut everyone else down, the low-intensity user should be given
an incentive to sell to someone who wants to use the property in
a way compatible with the basic regional pattern. The legal rule
sensibly induces a greater homogeneity of uses, and this in turn
allows other areas to impose stricter uniform standards. In effect,
the right live-and-let-live rule sorts land uses by neighborhoods,
and in doing so, minimizes the social costs of any given level of
pollution.
a. Physical Asymmetries
One common definition of fairness speaks of creating a
level playing field so that neither side has the upper hand. Un-
fortunately, nature does not always provide that level playing
field for upstream and downstream riparians (that is, those
whose lands border rivers or lakes) or for landowners on the top
and bottom of a hill. How should nuisance law respond? One
possibility is to make no allowance at all. The party at the top of
the hill, T, has a more limited set of uses because of the harm his
"See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 831 (1977) (locality rule).
4 See Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229, 234 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932);
see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1103 (2008).
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conduct causes to the landowner at the bottom of the hill, B. The
legal system thus offsets T's natural advantage by, for instance,
holding the defendant strictly liable for any discharge that floods
the mines below. 46 But here again the situation is likely to prove
more nuanced. In Middlesex Co. v. McCue,47 Justice Holmes was
faced with the question of whether to enjoin the defendant from
filling up the plaintiff's mill pond with the runoff created when
the defendant gardened on his plot. In denying the plaintiff an
injunction, he posited that the case was too clear for dispute on
the ground that:
a man has a right to cultivate his land in the usual and rea-
sonable way, as well upon a hill as in the plain, [so] that
damage to the lower proprietor of the kind complained of is
something that he must protect himself against as best he
may. The plaintiff says that a wall would stop the trouble. If
so, it can build one upon its own land.48
The decision is notable for two points. First, the construction of
the wall does not require joint care, as either party can build it as
cheaply as the other. Putting this burden on the downhill owner
eliminates the litigation costs and will tend to spur action where
such is necessary. Indeed, B already has good reason to build that
wall for, on any theory, B gets no protection against any flood or
natural disaster that starts on T's land, because there is no act of the
defendant on which to predicate liability.49 In similar fashion, the
uphill owner gets no protection against the loss of support from
below. Yet it hardly follows that the no-liability rule is maintained
in all other cases. Holmes was careful to note that his rule would
not protect against the release of offensive materials into the drain-
age system, even though these might not migrate to the plaintiff's
land if both were on level ground.
The one difficulty with the Holmes rule is that it does not de-
velop any clear liability rule to shape conduct where the efficient
46 Baird v. Williamson, [1863] 143 Eng. Rep. 831 (C.B.).
47 21 N.E. 230 (Mass. 1889).
48 Id. at 231.
49 See, e.g., Smith v. Kenrick, [1849] 137 Eng. Rep. 205 (Q.B.).
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solution would require coordinated actions to be taken at both the
top and bottom of the hill. The test here is whether a single owner
of both plots of land would divide his precautions between the up-
per and lower portions of the land. It is not surprising therefore that
legal systems divide on whether the law should require B to take
just those precautions with her land, which is the result that exists
under various reasonable user systems. 50 The problem becomes
even more complex if B builds before T because precautions against
natural runoff will often not suffice against the increased runoff
after construction. Again the question is close, but the more numer-
ous the parties, the stronger the case for putting modest affirmative
duties of self-protection, perhaps by statute, on B and others simi-
larly situated to deal with the joint-care problem.
The issue here is similar to the famous question of whether the
owner of flax is under an affirmative duty to store it at a remote
distance from the track. The danger here is the risk that fire will
spread over land, as it can easily do in dry conditions, when cut
grass acts like a fuse across which any flame can race. The common
law response is divided, and in the most famous of these cases,
LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co.,51 the
majority took the position that the plaintiff owed no duty to protect
against a future wrong on the grounds that no landowner (or rail-
road) can-by threat-impose affirmative duties on his neighbor.
Yet a clear statutory duty to provide these setbacks could reduce
the losses by gravitating toward a more efficient solution that re-
quires both parties to take some degree of care. This is the thought
that lies behind Holmes's dissent in LeRoy, where he would have
essentially imposed on the flax owner the risk of loss in any case
where the flax would have been destroyed by the low-level spark
emissions from a well-operated train.5 2
b. Temporal Asymmetries
Thus far the analysis has dealt with temporal externalities only
insofar as they relate to the same parcel of land. But the question of
temporal sequencing also arises between neighbors. In many cases
50 See, e.g., Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1966).
51 232 U.S. 340 (1914).
52 Id. at 352-53.
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the parties arrive simultaneously. In others, however, temporal
asymmetries arise. For example, one of two established landowners
may develop his property before the second. The most common
version of this "coming to the nuisance" problem has one party, D,
engage in an intensive land use with negative spillovers, such as
running a mine or a pig farm.53 At the inception of the activity, his
neighbor, P, is doing nothing with her land that is compromised by
that normally noxious use. Subsequently, P changes her use so that
D's conduct now has a negative effect on the new use, as when a
neighbor builds a private home next to the piggery. Can the home
owner close down the piggery?
The usual and correct answer is yes, subject to a transitional
period to phase out the piggery. The explanation for this rule re-
quires an optimization strategy that spans both periods of devel-
opment. The law could allow P to enjoin the use before she suffers
any physical harm: all invasions are nuisances -period. But now we
have the unhappy specter of stopping a high-valued use to protect
no use at all, and this makes little sense given that there is, by defi-
nition, no environmental degradation. So it makes sense to post-
pone any injunction until the time of actual conflict (which may
never occur). Yet the law cannot ask P to stop her action at the out-
set if she will be time-barred at some later time: to do so is to admit
that there is a grievance, only to find no time at which it may be
properly brought. So the statute of limitations starts to run only
with actual conflict in neighboring uses.54 From the perspective of
that later time, it appears as if the dislocations of an injunction are
excessive. But that rule is surely preferable to the two alternatives:
(1) shutting down the piggery before any harm happens, or (2) let-
ting the piggery operate, unless P decides to build a house that is
not needed today to preserve the option to use it tomorrow. On bal-
ance, the current rule makes sense.
5 See, e.g., Pendoley v. Ferreira, 187 N.E.2d 142 (Mass. 1963); Ensign v. Walls, 34
N.W.2d 549 (Mich. 1948) (concerning a kennel for St. Bernard dogs).
54 See Sturges v. Bridgman, [1879] 11 Ch.D. 852, 859 (concerning the point at which
complainant may bring action to court).
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c. Common Pool Problems
One major obstacle to the effective regulation of oil and gas
pools is that their large size frequently precludes a single surface
owner from controlling their exploitation in rational fashion.55 The
simple prohibition against slant drilling, for example, does not stop
excessive drilling that siphons off oil underneath adjacent plots. The
consequent risk of premature exploitation has obvious relevance to
conservation, but it has equal implications for the standard form of
environmental harm; rapid exploitation leads to excessive pollution
from uncapped wells. Nor should there be reflexive preference for
either common law or statutory solutions on matters of this sort.
Historically, the inconveniences attendant to excessive drilling
were intuitively understood, as were the limits on the common law
tools available to combat wasteful behavior that did not invade or-
dinary private rights. These points are all evidenced in Hague v.
Wheeler,56 where the defendant's drilling for gas caused damage
both above and below the surface, neither of which could be effec-
tively addressed by the traditional common law remedies that gov-
erned relationships between neighbors. Here are two instructive
passages. The first reveals the inability to bring these cases into the
field of invasive nuisances.
Does the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, require
us to grant the relief sought in this case? If in burning the
gas from their well the defendants should direct the jet to-
wards the plaintiff's buildings or timber, or should leave it
uncontrolled so that the wind might drive it against or to-
wards the plaintiff's property so as to injure or endanger it,
a case would be presented in which the maxim would be
applicable and we should take pleasure in enforcing it. If
the defendant's well produced nothing and they were leav-
ing it without plugging so that the water might find its way
into the sand-rock to the injury of others, we could punish
them under the statute which prescribes the manner of
plugging an unproductive well, and makes it obligatory on
55 See Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714 (Pa. 1893) (involving a release of gas which re-
sulted in both pollution and deterioration of the common pool).
36 Id. at 718-19.
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the owner to adopt it. But we have a well drilled for a law-
ful purpose, in a lawful manner, and actually producing
gas which is not directed towards the property of another,
or so consumed as to affect the buildings, timber, or crops
of any adjoining owner.57
The passage is quite correct in its conclusion that the case does
not fall into the usual categories of invasive nuisance because the
siphoning off that takes place did not stem from extending the de-
fendant's drilling apparatus below the plaintiff's land. The alterna-
tive theory urged in Hague insisted that the presence of the defen-
dant's "malice" should tip the balance against the defendant, to
which the court replied:
[T]he fact that it was drilled at the request of the company
and not of the mere motion of the defendants was an an-
swer to any allegation of malice or negligence on the part of
Hague as well as on the part of the company, since it ac-
counted for the act of drilling by assigning a motive there-
for both lawful and neighborly.5 8
This argument reflects a common preoccupation with an ex-
panded role for "malice" during the 1890s when the question of
how to regulate various commons came before the courts in large
numbers.59 The difficulties of importing this notion are legion, how-
ever. Traditionally, the role of malice is as an intensifier. Hitting
57 Id. at 719.
m Id. at 718.
-9 For academic accounts, see J. B. Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the
Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 HARv. L. REV. 411 (1905); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894). For relevant cases, see, for exam-
ple, Bradford Corp. v. Pickles, [1895] A.C. 587 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.),
which held that a malicious diversion of water from a downstream user was not
actionable. See also Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946, 948 (Minn. 1909) (Elliott, J.), which
accepted the proposition that "when a man starts an opposition place of business,
not for the sake of profit to himself, but regardless of loss to himself, and for the sole
purpose of driving his competitor out of business, and with the intention of himself
retiring upon the accomplishment of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of a wan-
ton wrong and an actionable tort" only to decide that this claim could not be made
out in the absence of proof that the defendant ran its business at a loss.
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someone is bad; hitting them with malice is inexcusable and thus
prompts the award of punitive damages. Malice does not make the
tort; it aggravates the situation.60 Given the relationship between
malice and the traditional torts, the next generation of cases does
not explain why malice is needed in some cases when it is not
needed in others. More specifically, all the actions that cover inva-
sions of person and property are usually actionable under a strict
liability theory6l or require, at most, proof of negligence, which is
then made easier by using res ipsa loquitur to shift the burden of
proof.62 But where these physical invasions do not take place, it is
wholly unclear why-or when-an allegation of malice should fill
the gap.
Nor, it turned out, was the problem confined to land use dis-
putes. The resort to malice in Hague has its exact contemporary ana-
logue in trade cases dealing with unlawful competition or "preda-
tion,"63 as well as in cases of collective refusals to deal in connection
with union boycotts. 64 That connection is not accidental; in each
case there was an acute sense that the common law prohibitions
against the use of force and fraud came up short against any then-
nascent standard of social welfare. In both cases, the purported reli-
ance on malice was too restrictive, for it only covered those situa-
tions in which the defendant hurt the plaintiff solely without any
prospect of tangible or economic gain to himself. That account of
malice is not quite an empty set, but it is close. Cases of resource
exploitation and economic competition almost never fall into that
category given the close correspondence between individual self-
interest and economic advancement.
60 See, e.g., Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1852) (tying punitive damages to
trespasses that are, of course, independently actionable).
61 See, e.g., Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K.), affg Fletcher v. Rylands, [1866] 1 L.R. Exch. 265.
62 For one early suggestion of that approach in Rylands-type situations, see Ezra Rip-
ley Thayer, Liability Without Fault, 29 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1916).
63 See, e.g., Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., [1889] 23 Q.B.D. 598.
64 See Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C. 1 (H.L.) (headnote: "An act which in itself is lawful
cannot be converted into a legal wrong because it was done with a bad motive.");
Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Ir.) (holding that a col-
lective refusal to deal with a business is unlawful where there is an intent to harm,
and that the rule in Allen that motive is irrelevant applies only to a person acting
alone).
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The larger question, however, is this: why should self-interest
count as a justification for a defendant's action at all in situations
like Mogul when it is never allowed in cases of assault and bat-
tery? This disparity is never explained, chiefly because the under-
lying conception of social welfare, with its attendant coordination
problems, was not understood. 65 The correct response involves
answering this question: does the private right of action created
advance or retard some overall notion of social welfare? In dealing
with the assault cases, the answer to that question is that allowing
the private suit advances social welfare. Hurting another individual
creates not only a private loss to that person, but also a private loss
to all those persons who choose to deal with him, of which only a
small fraction -chiefly spouses who sue for loss of consortium, a
cause of action denied to children 66-are allowed to bring actions
for themselves. It follows therefore that the administrative-cost con-
straint against allowing these second-tier actions means that any
compensation that is afforded to the accident victim represents only
part-and not all-of the relevant social losses. But for these pur-
poses, the correct question is not whether the common action leads
to social optimality; this is impossible to obtain under ordinary cir-
cumstances. Instead, the correct question is whether allowing that
action improves the prior state of affairs, which the ordinary suit for
assault and battery does, by reducing the frequency of these attacks
and, with it, the collateral harms to third persons.
65 See Mogul S.S., 23 Q.B.D. at 614:
To the argument that a competition so pursued ceases to have a just cause
or excuse when there is ill-will or a personal intention to harm, it is suffi-
cient to reply ... that there was here no personal intention to do any other
or greater harm to the plaintiffs than such as was necessarily involved in
the desire to attract to the defendants' ships the entire tea freights of the
ports, a portion of which would otherwise have fallen to the plaintiffs'
share.
The question that Lord Justice Bowen does not answer in Mogul is why the definition
of an intentional or malicious wrong is more demanding in the trade cases than the
physical injury cases. See also Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD.
391, 420-41 (1975) (also discussing these cases).
66 See, e.g., Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (allowing actions for
husbands as well as wives); Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977) (de-
nying actions to children for loss of parental consortium).
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Using that test with respect to competitive harms yields the op-
posite conclusion. In ordinary situations, competition produces net
social gains which cannot be topped by various forms of regulation.
Allowing actions for unfair competition that do not involve the use
of force or fraud thus reduces overall social welfare. Invoking the
notion of malice in these contexts is presumptively a mistake. Stated
otherwise, allowing an ordinary action for assault and battery nor-
mally has a positive impact on the interests of third persons. Yet al-
lowing actions against competitive harms normally has a negative
impact on those same interests. More precisely, the anticompetitive
action produces social losses while the anticoercive action generates
social gains. It is only when the discussion turns to common pools
and monopolies that there is a positive correlation between allow-
ing suit and the systematic improvement of third parties, so only
in those situations should the action be allowed. At this point it
becomes clear why the trade cases and the oil and gas case each
attracted the use of malice. The former raises the question of mo-
nopoly and latter the problem of overextraction. In effect, both
types of actions emerge because of the shared perception that a
breakdown in bargaining directs the law in the wrong direction.
Consumers cannot organize themselves to insist on competition,
and landowners cannot organize themselves to limit production.
This is why malice turned out to be a poor tool to fill a deep void in
the common law structure and why, once specific schemes to regu-
late common pools and monopoly were developed, malice receded
mercifully into the background.
The weakness of these conceptions was not lost on the courts. In
Hague, for example, the court did not indulge in any dubious pre-
sumption that its common law rules, however useful, were beyond
improvement through regulatory devices: "Now it is doubtless true
that the public has a sufficient interest in the preservation of oil and
gas from waste to justify legislation upon this subject." 67 As the ear-
lier discussion of the sic utero tuo maxim pointed out,68 the common
law rule against invasive nuisances does respond to serious envi-
ronmental dislocations. But its strength has to be put into context.
The move to create strong possessory rights is only a useful first
67 Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714, 719 (Pa. 1893).
68 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
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step to controlling abuses along the spatial dimension, which in this
instance led to the premature exhaustion of the field. Strong posses-
sory rights are necessary, but not sufficient, to avoid abuses of this
sort. The larger logic parallels the changes in the temporal elements
of possession. Look for Pareto improvements through regulation,
and be skeptical about the ease with which these could be ob-
tained.69 And when obtained, the restrictions on each surface owner
may impose a taking on some, or even all, members of the group, as
I have argued elsewhere. 70 But, if so, the acid test is whether the
overall scheme provides implicit-in-kind compensation by allowing
each landowner an appropriate fraction of the resulting gain.7'
II. MOVEMENT INTO THE PUBLIC SPHERE
A. NUISANCE REGULATION
It is now necessary to briefly discuss how these principles trans-
late into a coherent policy of environmental law. In dealing with
this issue, one obvious parallel is to public nuisances, a well devel-
oped area of law, that arise when a private party pollutes, say, a
river or lake that has no private owner, or creates social disameni-
ties that have strong negative effects on large a number of land-
owners. Here, one possibility allows all riparians or other injured
individuals to mount a class action with its immense procedural
complexities. Alternatively, the state could sue to enjoin the nui-
sance, so long as it meets the same requirements for a private nui-
sance in terms of the level of offense.72 The emphasis here should be
on substance, and the key rule of transformation from the private to
the public space is this: the state has the same rights, no more and no
less, as any private owner under the law of trespass and nuisance. The
69 For a more theoretical account of the process, see Richard A. Epstein, supra note 5.
70 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLEcT: How TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY (2008).
71 For discussion, see EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 6, at 219-23. For a case that upheld
these statutes, see Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1899), which on closer exami-
nation turned out to skew in favor of gas drillers at the expense of oil owners, for
which a public choice explanation about favoring local interests is in fact correct. See
Richard A. Epstein, The Modern Uses of Ancient Law, 48 S.C. L. REV. 243, 254-58 (1997).
72 See, e.g., People v. Mason, 177 Cal. Rptr. 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (allowing state
standing to sue for individuals inconvenienced by loud music coming from the de-
fendant's bar).
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efficient rules for dealing with private/private interactions set the
stage for private/public interactions. The objective is not to expand
the definition of nuisance, but to find additional ways to supplement
individual lawsuits when they are insufficient to stop the nuisance
at hand.
Similarly, air pollution is the combination of many low-level
nuisances. Again the social response could use either class actions
or direct regulation. But again the procedural issues are second-
order. The first-order considerations involve the interaction be-
tween damages and injunctions. On this issue, the total elimination
of all pollution makes no more sense in the public arena than in the
private. The trick is to reduce the pollution to acceptable levels,
which are positive and not zero. What that proper level is may often
be a subject of dispute. As the discussion of the locality rule sug-
gests, 73 higher levels of affluence call for lower levels of pollution.
That same principle should apply to public nuisances. And as with
live-and-let-live regimes, regional variations in pollution levels
make sense if they lead to intelligent groupings of high- and low-
intensity activities. Again, modem environmental law should be a
sound descendant of ordinary private law principles.
The problems in the public sphere are also compounded by
temporal and spatial asymmetries. But again the private law offers
useful guidance. If the state wants to impose emissions control on
a piggery or a foundry because new development has taken place
in the neighborhood, the coming-to-the-nuisance cases supply
useful precedents so that these restrictions (subject to a caveat
about transitions) could be imposed without compensation, as
they generally are.74
Yet, in other cases, the temporal and physical asymmetries can
lead to major environmental distortions. The Supreme Court case of
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
raised both forms of asymmetry.75 The incumbent landowners had
built first on hillsides from which excessive runoff polluted Lake Ta-
hoe (known for its dark blue color), resulting in great environmental
loss. But which landowners, the early arrivals or the latecomers,
73 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
74 See Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
7 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
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should bear the heaviest burdens? The principles discussed earlier
give a clear clue. 76 Earlier polluters should receive no preference
since that just creates an incentive for them to engage in the nonstop
paving that generated the excessive pollution. We thus have a situa-
tion where the poor design of rules governing the commons creates
an additional environmental risk. If the Planning Agency wishes to
force the neighbors to leave their plots unbuilt, or to require them
to adopt expensive construction techniques (for example, building
on stilts) for modest buildings, they should be required to com-
pensate for regulatory losses imposed. Why? To create the proper
rate of substitution between early- and late-users, which eliminates
this environmental distortion. Thus if the early builders laid down
extensive asphalt of little value, they will dig that up and restore the
land to its original condition rather than pay a fortune to block a
neighbor from using a buildable lot. But the Supreme Court, which
revealed no grasp of these intertemporal issues, upheld the extra
regulatory burdens on the latecomers, giving no one any incentive
to undo any inefficient overdevelopment. 77 This broad use of regu-
latory power thus creates an enormous risk of implicit transfers be-
tween different parties subject to a unified regulatory scheme,
which puts real pressure on the twin issues of takings and just
compensation, discussed next.
B. TAKINGS AND JUST COMPENSATION
Any system of public enforcement should respect the difference
between nuisances that may be enjoined as of right and land use
restrictions that private parties must acquire by easement (to cause
nuisances to neighbors) or covenant (to enjoin conduct, such as that
pertaining to air and light). This one principle has enormous impli-
cations for the entire field of environmental law because it reduces
the range of cases in which state regulation should be allowed
without just compensation to the aggrieved owner.
First, should the state be able to impose height- and setback-
restrictions on individuals in order to improve the views or light of
others? To resolve this question, we have to distinguish between
76 For further elaboration of this view, see Richard A. Epstein, The Ebbs and Flows in
Takings Law: Reflections on the Lake Tahoe Case, 1 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 5, 23-28 (2002).
77 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302.
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two cases, recognizing that some intermediate cases will occur. The
first situation involves the so-called "average reciprocity of advan-
tage" where each party benefits from the restrictions imposed on
others.78 At that point, the regulation itself contains, as I am fond
of saying, implicit-in-kind compensation. All group members are
left better off than before, so that the regulation overcomes the
transactional obstacles that prevent cooperation without disad-
vantaging some individuals for the benefit of others. The prospect
of uniform improvement across all class members thus sharply
reduces the danger of factional struggle. It also gets a better judge
of environmental amenities for, in the typical case, the new con-
struction that blocks the views of people who live elsewhere also
creates new views, and hence new environmental amenities for the
persons who live in the new structure. Typically, we can be confi-
dent that the established owners will not be willing to pay to stop
the new construction, the value of which reflects the views that
would be created for its new tenants. From that position we can
infer that the total value from both plots of land is greater if each
can build. In order to prevent premature construction solely to pro-
tect future rights, the proper response is that no person gets to limit
the construction on a neighbor's land solely by making like use of
his own first. Freed of that strategic risk, parties can wait to develop
land until the time to do so is optimal.
In the second situation, the regulations hurt some landowners
but help others. Now the danger is that cohesive interest groups
will seek through regulation - for which they pay nothing - benefits
that would require compensation if done privately. No private
landowner can tell his neighbor not to build in ways that block his
view of the sea. Why then allow a zoning ordinance to achieve that
result in the public arena, without paying compensation?
In principle, of course, there is a sensible justification for some zon-
ing laws; they replicate the outcomes from a sound system of ease-
ments and covenants in circumstances where high transaction costs
prevent their voluntary creation. But here is the stem warning that
goes with the program: in practice, this result can - "will" is always too
strong-be achieved only if the political process could duplicate the
results that are achieved in private planned-unit developments, where
78 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
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unanimous consent is routinely obtained. It is just at this point where
public processes diverge from private ones. Zoning rules are imposed
through majoritarian processes. If they are not constrained by any
form of constitutional restriction, nothing prevents the zoning boards
from imposing regulations that do not create overall improvements,
but create instead transfers from one group to another through politi-
cal clout. That result can happen if restrictions prevent a new devel-
opment by one landowner that could go into economic competition
with those that exist, causing a predictable decline in social welfare. It
could also lead to forms of environmental dislocation if certain land-
owners are exempt from sensible controls that are applied to others.
There is only one approach that offers some counterweight to the
zoning difficulty, which is to subject the winners of these implicit
wealth transfers to an explicit just compensation requirement, meas-
ured by the net loss in land value to members of the losing faction.
That financial requirement means that the winners will be forced to
take into account the position of the losers, which creates a fair
chance that one would recreate the same set of overall improvements
that private developers achieve when they use these covenants. Of
course, the antinuisance prohibitions should remain in effect, but
these are typically not hot-button issues in these zoning cases, where
new entrants never come within a country mile of a violation of the
common law rules. The shift in arenas should not put the develop-
ment rights of all landowners up for grabs in the political process.
The no-compensation rule also aggravates all the temporal issues by
giving the first to build a first-mover advantage over the second,
which the private law has systematically denied, and for good rea-
sons. Hence the basic rule should enjoin regulations with dispropor-
tionate impact unless the losers receive full compensation. That com-
pensation rule has more than simple distributional effects. It also sets
prices and creates incentives for beneficial political behavior, thereby
applying rules that work in the private sector.
This general approach questions today's dominant view that
allows regulations - without compensation - to restrict the ability
to build ordinary homes in coastal areas, to require habitat to be
set aside for endangered species, to limit construction in or drain-
age of wetlands, and to require no-growth or development zones.
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The objection here does not go to the Kelo79 question of whether
these regulations may be imposed. We can freely concede that
the regulations are intended to advance a public use. But the ab-
sence of compensation encourages government regulators to
push for regulation with positive value to a political majority
because the regulators will perceive any cost to the regulated
parties as carrying a zero price. Yet any sound social calculus
cannot ignore costs to the losers and look solely at gains to the
winners. Nor can local governments excuse themselves on the
ground that they cannot afford to pay for changes they need,
given their taxing power. Any undue concern for the uncompen-
sated loss of amenities for the public has to make peace with the
disproportionate impact that local governments wish to throw
on individual landowners who do not have the taxing power to
ease their burdens. The takings law is intended to induce re-
sponsible political decisions, which won't happen if all losses
that are compensable as between citizen and citizen become un-
compensable as between citizen and state.
This concern is not just theoretical, and a real life story helps
put matters into context. In the famous 1992 decision Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,80 the Court struck down a regula-
tion that prohibited a landowner from building on coastal dunes
when it reduced the value of a plot from $250,000 (a real social
loss) to zero. In consequence, the Coastal Council was required
to purchase the land outright for its market value. It now had to
internalize the full costs of its decision. What did it do next? It
sold the land, of course. And to whom? Not to the neighbor who
would pay $150,000 because he could use it as a side yard, but to
an outsider, for the full $250,000, who was allowed to build (as
Mr. Lucas, the original landowner, had intended to do). The
moral: talk here is cheap, but taxation is not. People will talk ex-
pansively about benefits they get from quiet and solitude, but
not when they have to pay for them by raising taxes. Put other-
wise, the power of any community to tax for its benefit necessar-
ily eliminates the claim that these programs should be allowed to
go forward without compensation, which is the only way to get
79 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
- 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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an honest revelation of value. And that is what environmental
law is about: getting the right incentives, by following the pat-
terns developed with care and sensitivity to private disputes.
III. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this essay has been to explore the effect of
sound systems of property rights on matters of environmental con-
cern. The development and protection of private property rules was
often done for reasons that had little explicit connection to modem
notions of environmental protection. But that hardly means that
they did not make contributions to the overall improvement of en-
vironmental conditions through the use of damages and injunctions
under common law principles, which they did. The initial stage in
this evolution was the recognition that possession taken today
would last forever until it was transferred or abandoned. That one
rule cut out many of the perverse incentives that lead parties in
possession to wreck the land. Instead, with long-term ownership,
patterns of use and disposition take into account future values
along with present ones. The next key stage of development in-
volved the articulation of principles for trespass and nuisance to
deal with cases between neighbors. The easier situations are those
which operate in conditions of rough parity. But further modifica-
tions can take into account asymmetrical cases between neighbors
by the use, for example, of such techniques as the coming-to-the-
nuisance defense. And, lastly, common owners who are able to co-
ordinate their activities can develop rules and institutions that al-
low them to deal with the common-pool problems that they face, be
it with the medieval semicommons or the nineteenth century oil
and gas field.
The development of these rules, of course, does not create a so-
cial optimum, for three reasons. First, common law judges often get
lost in the complexity of the situations, as evidenced by the uneasy
effort to resolve these disputes by appealing to principles of malice
that have little traction in this area. Second, the widespread diffu-
sion of nuisances can neutralize the effect of ordinary private rights
of action, which in turn calls for the introduction of different proce-
dural devices, such as public nuisance suits and direct regulation.
Third, while none of these rules show that the movement from the
state of nature to common law reduced social value, they do show
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that the rules have not exhausted the potential level of social im-
provements that are available through government intervention.
Yet here the risk of public choice breakdown is serious, and that
breakdown carries with it the risk of both competitive dislocations
and environmental reversals, for which a sensible but insistent
system of takings rules offers the best line of defense. Forcing the
government to compensate for takings will ensure that it follows
the efficient principles that have been developed to regulate the
actions of private parties. In a sentence, the sound principles of
limited government are better able to meet the challenges of envi-
ronmental protection than any alternative theories that can be
identified in the welfare state.
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